Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Comment Name Email Website. Previous Post Previous. Next Post Next. Search Search. Subscribe to my newsletter! Another example of visual suppression is binocular rivalry. Here two ifferent images are simultaneously present, one in each eye. Say a photograph of a smiling girl is projected into your left eye and an image of a car is projected into your right eye.
Rather than appearing as the girl superimposed on the car, the two pictures rival for conscious access, and one will suppress the other briefly. So although the physical input to the eyes always remains the same, your conscious perception of it changes from one moment to the next and back again. Thus, from the point of view of psychoanalysis, it would be more proper to call this perceptual repression rather than perceptual suppression.
Whether the neural mechanisms underlying visual perceptual suppression and repression are related to those underlying psychodynamic suppression or repression remains to be determined.
Emotions Apart Dissociation is another controversial psychological state in which thoughts, emotions, sensations or memories are separated from the rest of the psyche. Originally championed by French psychiatrist Pierre Janet, dissociation can occur in healthy individuals such as when you blank out for a mile or two while driving along a freeway, become completely absorbed by a book or movie, or find yourself walking into a room in your house only to forget why you ventured there in the first place.
More extreme forms of dissociation manifest themselves in mental diseases such as dissociative identity disorder DID —formerly known as multiple personality disorder—which involves the presence of two or more distinct identity states. DID is considered to be a result of identity fragmentation rather than proliferation of separate personalities. So patients do not have more than one personality a proliferation of selves , but rather they have less than one a fragmented self.
This dissociative process allows traumatic feelings and memories to be psychologically separated off so that the person can function as if the trauma had not occurred.
While in one mental state, the patient has access to traumatic autobiographical memories, say of a rape, and intense emotional responses to them.
But when in her other state, she claims not to recall anything related to her rape. This defensive use of dissociation prevails long after the traumatic experiences have ended. Neurobiological studies of DID support the validity of the clinical diagnosis and suggest that one brain can generate two or more distinct states of self-awareness, each with its own unique pattern of seeing, thinking, behaving and remembering.
Physiological markers such as changes in electrical skin conductance related to sweating , heartbeat, response to medication, allergic reactions and endocrine function behave differently depending on which state the patient is in.
For example, Simone Reinders and her colleagues at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands recorded subjective reactions emotional, such as fear, and sensorimotor, such as restlessness , cardiovascular responses heart rate, blood pressure and heart rate variability and cerebral activation patterns in 11 DID patients. While the patients were first in one mental state and then the other, they were read a story from their life that pertained either to their trauma or to a nontraumatic autobiographical event.
When in their neutral mental state, patients reacted to the story of their traumatic experience as if it were a neutral memory and claimed not to recall it; when in their traumatic personality state, they had a significant subjective and cardiovascular reaction to the traumatic memory and a different cerebral activation pattern, and they remembered the event.
It appears that different identities can truly live inside the same skull. To See or Not to See Sometimes the difference between the personalities can be as stark as night and day.
Psychoanalysts Bruno Waldvogel and Axel Ullrich and psychologist Hans Strasburger, all in Munich, Germany, reported a dissociated patient who gradually regained sight during psychotherapy—after 15 years of diagnosed blindness.
During the experiment reported here, one personality state had essentially normal eyesight, whereas a younger, male personality—which could be summoned momentarily by calling out his name—was blind.
This phenomenon could be construed as hysterical ranting were it not for the electrical activity recorded by electroencephalographic scalp electrodes.
What are the differences regarding the capacity to dream for neurotic and borderline personality organizations? Our research aims to integrate psychodynamics, infant research, and neuroscientific findings to better understand the role of dreams in the assessment and treatment of, especially, traumatized and borderline patients. The capacity to dream is here proposed as a sort of enacted manifestation of emotional memories for the development of a more cohesive, coherent and symbolic vs fragmented, diffuse and alexithymic sense of self.
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